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Abstract: The doctrine of the Father’s begetting the Son in his divine nature, 
despite its credal affirmation, enjoys no clear scriptural support and 
threatens to introduce an objectionable ontological subordinationism into 
the doctrine of the Trinity. We should therefore think of Christ’s sonship as 
a function of his incarnation, even if that role is assumed beginninglessly. 
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Introduction 
 
On the Christian view God is not a single person, as traditionally conceived in 
Jewish monotheism, but is tri-personal. The New Testament church was sure that 
only one God existed, but it also affirmed that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, 
while personally distinct, all deserved to be called God. The challenge facing the 
post-apostolic church was how to make sense of these affirmations. How could the 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit each be God without there being either three Gods or 
only one person? 
 
Logos Christology 
 
The stage for both the later Trinitarian Controversy and the Christological 
Controversy, in which the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation were forged and 
given creedal form, was set by the early Greek Apologists of the second century, 
such as Justin Martyr, Tatian, Theophilus, and Athenagoras. Connecting the divine 
Word (Logos) of the prologue of John’s Gospel (Jn. 1.1-5) with the divine Logos 
(Reason) as it played a role in the system of the Hellenistic Jewish philosopher 
Philo of Alexandria (25 BC-AD 40), the Apologists sought to explain Christian 
doctrine in Philonic categories. For good or for ill, their appropriation of Hellenistic 
thought is one of the most striking examples of the profound and enduring 
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influence of philosophy upon Christian theology. For Philo the Logos was God’s 
reason, which is the creative principle behind the creation of the world and which, 
in turn, informs the world with its rational structure. Similarly, for the Christian 
Apologists, God the Father, existing alone without the world, had within Himself 
His Word or Reason or Wisdom (cf. Prov. 8.22-31), which somehow proceeded 
forth from Him, like a spoken word from a speaker’s mind, to become a distinct 
individual who created the world and ultimately became incarnate as Jesus Christ. 
The procession of the Logos from the Father was variously conceived as taking 
place either at the moment of creation or, alternatively, eternally. Although 
Christological concerns occupied center stage, the Holy Spirit, too, might be 
understood to proceed from God the Father’s mind.  
Here is how Athenagoras describes it: 
 
The Son of God is the Word of the Father in Ideal Form and energizing power; for 
in his likeness and through him all things came into existence, which presupposes 
that the Father and the Son are one. Now since the Son is in the Father and the 
Father in the Son by a powerful unity of Spirit, the Son of God is the mind and 
reason of the Father… He is the first begotten of the Father. The term is used not 
because he came into existence (for God, who is eternal mind, had in himself his 
word or reason from the beginning, since he was eternally rational) but because he 
came forth to serve as Ideal Form and Energizing Power for everything material 
(…) The (…) Holy Spirit (…) we regard as an effluence of God which flows forth 
from him and returns like a ray of the sun (A Plea for the Christians 10). 
 
According to this doctrine, then, there is one God, but He is not an undifferentiated 
unity. Rather certain aspects of His mind become expressed as distinct individuals. 
The Logos doctrine of the Apologists thus involves a fundamental reinterpretation 
of the Fatherhood of God: God is not merely the Father of mankind or Israel or 
even, especially, of Jesus of Nazareth, rather He is the Father from whom the 
Logos is begotten before all worlds. Christ is not merely the only-begotten Son of 
God in virtue of his Incarnation; rather he is begotten of the Father even in his pre-
incarnate divinity. 
 
The Heritage of Nicea 
 
The Logos-doctrine of the Greek Apologists was taken up into Western theology 
by Irenaeus, who identifies God’s Word with the Son and His Wisdom with the 
Holy Spirit (Against Heresies 4.20.3; cf. 2.30.9). Tertullian not only accepts the view 
of the Greek Apologists that there are relations of derivation among the persons of 
the Trinity, but that these relations are not eternal. The Father he calls “the 
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fountain of the Godhead” (Against Praxeas 29); “the Father is the entire substance, 
but the Son is a derivation and portion of the whole” (9). The Father exists 
eternally with His immanent Logos, and at creation, before the beginning of all 
things, the Son proceeds from the Father and so becomes His first begotten Son, 
through whom the world is created (19). Thus, the Logos only becomes the Son of 
God when He proceeds from the Father as a substantive being (7). Tertullian is 
fond of analogies such as the sunbeam emitted by the sun or the river by the spring 
(8, 22) to illustrate the oneness of substance of the Son as He proceeds from the 
Father. The Son, then, is “God of God” (15). Similarly, the Holy Spirit proceeds 
from the Father through the Son (4). It seems that Tertullian would consider the 
Son and Spirit to be distinct persons only after their procession from the Father (7); 
but it is clear that he insists on their personal distinctness from at least that point. 
In the East theologians like Origen also adhered to the derivation of the divine Son 
from the Father, although they maintained, in contrast to Tertullian, that the 
begetting of the Logos from the Father did not have a beginning but is from 
eternity. 
In 319 an Alexandrian presbyter named Arius began to propagate his doctrine 
that the Son was not of the same substance with the Father, but was rather created 
by the Father before the beginning of the world. What the orthodox Fathers found 
so objectionable about Arius’s doctrine was not that the Logos had a beginning but 
that he was created. Arius denied that the Logos pre-existed even immanently in 
God before being begotten or was in any sense from the substance of the Father, so 
that his beginning was not, in fact, a begetting but a creation ex nihilo and that 
therefore the Son is a creature. As Athanasius was later to protest, on Arius’s view 
God without the Son lacked His Word and His Wisdom, which is blasphemous 
(Orations against the Arians 1.6.17). On Arius’s view, the Son is “a creature and a 
work, not proper to the Father’s essence” (1.3.9). In 325 the Council of Antioch 
condemned anyone who says that the Son is a creature or originated or made or 
not truly an offspring or that once he did not exist; and later that year the 
ecumenical Council of Nicea issued its creedal formulation of Trinitarian belief. 
The Nicene Creed states, 
 
We believe in one God, the Father All Governing, creator of all things visible and 
invisible;  
And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, begotten of the Father as only 
begotten, that is, from the essence of the Father, God from God, Light from Light, 
true God from true God, begotten not created, of the same essence as the Father, 
through whom all things came into being, both in heaven and in earth; Who for us 
men and for our salvation came down and was incarnate, becoming human. He 
WILLIAM LANE CRAIG 
25 
 
suffered and the third day he rose, and ascended into the heavens. And he will 
come to judge both the living and the dead.  
And [we believe] in the Holy Spirit.  
 
Notice that the Son (and by implication the Holy Spirit) is declared to be of the 
same essence (homoousios) as the Father. This is to say that the Son and Father both 
exemplify the same divine nature. Therefore, the Son cannot be a creature, 
exemplifying, as Arius claimed, a nature different (heteroousias) from the divine 
nature. Therefore, the Son is declared to be begotten, not made. This anti-Arian 
affirmation represents the legacy of the old Logos Christology and is said with 
respect to Christ’s divine nature, not his human nature. In the creed of Eusebius of 
Caesarea, used as a draft of the Nicene statement, the word “Logos” stood where 
“Son” stands in the Nicene Creed, and the Logos is declared to be “begotten of the 
Father before all ages.” The condemnations appended to the Nicene Creed 
similarly imply that this begetting is eternal:  
 
But, those who say, Once he was not, or he was not before his generation, or he 
came to be out of nothing, or who assert that he, the Son of God, is a different 
hypostasis or ousia, or that he is a creature, or changeable, or mutable, the Catholic 
and Apostolic Church anathematizes them.1  
 
Athanasius explains through a subtle word play that while both the Father and the 
Son are agenētos (that is, did not come into being at some moment), nevertheless 
only the Father is agennētos (that is, unbegotten), whereas the Son is gennētos 
(begotten) eternally from the Father (Four Discourses against the Arians 1.9.31). 
A Social Trinitarian Model of the Trinity 
Enlightenment thinkers denounced the doctrine of the Trinity as an incoherence; 
but during the twentieth century many theologians came to a reappreciation of 
Trinitarian theology, and in recent decades a number of Christian philosophers 
have sought to formulate defensible versions of the doctrine of the Trinity. In 
Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview I have defended a type of social 
Trinitarianism, which lays emphasis on the diversity of the divine persons.2 
According to the model offered there, we are to think of God on the analogy of the 
human soul. What makes the human soul a person is that the human soul is 
equipped with rational faculties of intellect and volition which enable it to be a 
self-reflective agent capable of self-determination. Now God is very much like an 
                                                 
1 I leave to the side the controversial assertion that the Son is the same hypostasis as the Father 
because it is not germane to our discussion.  
2 See Moreland and Craig (2017, chap. 31).  
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unembodied soul; indeed, as a mental substance God just seems to be a soul. We 
naturally equate a rational soul with a person, since the human souls with which 
we are acquainted are persons. But the reason human souls are individual persons 
is because each soul is equipped with one set of rational faculties sufficient for 
being a person. I invite us, then, to suppose that God is a soul which is endowed 
with three complete sets of rational cognitive faculties, each sufficient for 
personhood. Then God, though one soul, would not be one person but three, for 
God would have three centers of self-consciousness, intentionality, and volition, as 
social Trinitarians maintain. God would clearly not be three discrete souls because 
the cognitive faculties in question are all faculties belonging to just one soul, one 
immaterial substance. God would therefore be one being which supports three 
persons, just as our individual beings each support one person. He is a single, tri-
personal being. Such a model of the Trinity seems to give a clear sense to the 
classical formula ”three persons in one substance.” 
 
The Begetting of the Son by the Father 
 
Notice that my proposed model does not feature (though it does not preclude) the 
derivation of one person from another, enshrined in the confession that the Son is 
“begotten of the Father before all worlds, Light of Light, very God of very God, 
begotten, not made” (Constantinopolitan Creed). God could simply exist eternally 
with His multiple cognitive faculties and capacities. This is, in my view, all for the 
better. For although credally affirmed, the doctrine of the generation of the Son 
(and the procession of the Spirit) is a relic of Logos Christology which finds 
virtually no warrant in the biblical text and introduces a subordinationism into the 
Godhead which anyone who affirms the full deity of Christ ought to find very 
troubling.  
Biblically speaking, the vast majority of contemporary New Testament scholars 
recognize that even if the word traditionally translated “only-begotten” 
(monogenēs) carries a connotation of derivation when used in familial contexts—as 
opposed to meaning merely “unique” or “one of a kind” as many scholars 
maintain3—nevertheless the biblical references to Christ as monogenēs (Jn 1.1, 14, 18; 
cf. Rev 9.13) do not contemplate some pre-creation or eternal procession of the 
divine Son from the Father, but have to do with the historical Jesus's being God's 
                                                 
3 See the fine summary discussion in Harris (1992, 84-103). That monogenēs in reference to Christ 
means more than just "only," but has a derivative connotation, is evident from the fact that while 
God the Father is called ho monos theos (the only God), He is not called (ho) monogenes theos, as is the 
Son (Jn 1.18).  
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special Son (Mt. 1.21-23; Lk. 1-35; Jn. 1.14, 34; Gal. 4.4; Heb. 1.5-6).4 In other words, 
Christ's status of being monogenēs has less to do with the Trinity than with the 
Incarnation. This primitive understanding of Christ's being begotten is still evident 
in Ignatius's description of Christ as “one Physician, of flesh and of spirit, begotten 
and unbegotten (...) both of Mary and of God” (Ephesians 7). There is here no idea 
that Christ in his divine nature is begotten. Indeed, the transference by the 
Apologists of Christ’s Sonship from Jesus of Nazareth to the pre-incarnate Logos 
has helped to depreciate the importance of the historical Jesus for Christian faith.  
Theologically speaking, orthodox theology has stoutly rejected any depreciation 
of the Son vis á vis the Father. Athanasius writes sternly, “They that depreciate the 
Only-Begotten Son of God blaspheme God, defaming His perfection and accusing 
Him of imperfection, and render themselves liable to the severest chastisement” (In 
illud omnia mihi tradia sunt 6). The target here was subordinationism, a doctrine 
inspired by Neo-Platonic and Gnostic metaphysics, according the which ultimate 
reality, or the One, could have no intercourse with the world and thus spawned a 
descending series of intermediate beings which, falling away from the perfection of 
the One, served as mediators between it and the world. Origen, trained under the 
Neo-Platonist philosopher Ammonius Saccas, had dared to speak of the Son as a 
deity of the second rank, having a sort of derivative divinity as far removed from 
that of the Father as He Himself is from creatures. Subsequent Church Fathers 
flatly rejected any suggestion that the Son was in any respect inferior to the Father, 
insisting that He shares the same substance or essence with the Father. 
Nevertheless, these same theologians continued to affirm the generation of the Son 
from the Father. The Son in their view derives his being from the Father. 
Athanasius quotes approvingly Dionysius's affirmation that “the Son has His being 
not of Himself but of the Father” (On the Opinion of Dionysius 15). Similarly, Hilary 
declares that “He is not the source of His own being (…) it is from His [the 
Father's] abiding nature that the Son draws His existence through birth” (On the 
Trinity 9.53; 6.14; cf. 4.9). This doctrine of the generation of the Logos from the 
Father cannot, despite assurances to the contrary, but diminish the status of the 
Son because He becomes an effect contingent upon the Father. Even if this eternal 
procession takes place necessarily and apart from the Father’s will, the Son is less 
than the Father because the Father alone exists a se, whereas the Son exists through 
another (ab alio).5  
                                                 
4 See discussion and literature in Baur (1992). 
5 This sentence should make it clear that my complaint is not that the Son’s being contingent on 
the Father implies that the Son does not exist necessarily, as Makin (2018, 4) alleges, but that the Son 
does not exist a se. Makin offers an intriguing model of eternal generation of the Son as the essential 
dependence of the Son on the Father. Essential dependence, he explains, holds when one entity is a 
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It is interesting to note that the Church Fathers interpreted the Arian proof-text, 
“The Father is greater than I” (Jn 14. 28), not in terms of Christ's humanity, but as 
an expression of his being generated from the Father (Athanasius Four Discourses 
against the Arians 1.13.58). Hilary admits:  
 
The Father is greater than the Son: for manifestly He is greater Who makes another 
to be all that He Himself is, Who imparts to the Son by the mystery of the birth the 
image of His own unbegotten nature, Who begets Him from Himself into His own 
form (On the Trinity 9.54).  
 
But then is the Son not inferior to the Father? Hilary denies it: "The Father therefore 
is greater, because He is Father: but the Son, because He is Son, is not less" (9.56). 
This is to talk logical nonsense. It is like saying that six is greater than four, but 
four is not less than six. Basil, who sees the contradiction, would elude it by saying, 
“the evident solution is that the Greater refers to origination, while the Equal 
belongs to the Nature” (Fourth Theological Oration 9). This reply raises all sorts of 
difficult questions. Does it not belong to the nature of the Father as an individual 
person to be unbegotten and to the nature of the Son to be begotten? Is there a 
possible world in which the person who is in fact the Father is instead begotten 
and so in that world is the Son? Classical Trinitarian theology denies this. But then 
how are the Father and the Son equal in nature, if greatness refers to origination 
and manner of origination belongs to each individual's nature? And even if the 
Father and the Son are equal in nature, why does the accidental property of being 
unbegotten, which inheres in the person of the Father alone, not make Him greater 
than the Son, since it is admittedly a great-making property or perfection? If the 
Father is greater than the Son in any respect, not just in nature, then the Son is in 
that respect inferior to the Father. At the end of the day Basil must deny that 
having existence a se is not, after all, a perfection or great-making property. He 
                                                                                                                                                    
constituent of a real definition of another entity. Makin seeks a real definition of the Son which 
involves the Father as a constituent. What is a real definition? Makin (2018, 8) says, “A real definition 
is a proposition representing the essence of an entity.” So is the Father a constituent of a 
proposition? We can avoid this untoward consequence by holding that a real definition of the Son 
in some way refers to the Father. We might then wonder why a real definition of the Father may 
not also refer to the Son, in which case essential dependence fails to be asymmetric. More 
troublesome still, Makin backs away from the claim that the Son depends essentially on the Father 
with respect to his generic essence and reserves that claim for the Son’s individual essence. But the 
notion of real definitions has to do with generic or kind essences, not individual essences, so that 
we seem to have a confusion of categories here. Finally, it seems that Makin’s essential dependence 
is altogether too weak to capture the notion of being begotten. How does one’s being defined in 
terms referring to something else make one generated by that thing or even dependent upon it?  
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asserts, “That which is from such a Cause is not inferior to that which has no 
Cause; for it would share the glory of the Unoriginate, because it is from the 
Unoriginate” (Ibid.) This claim is unconvincing, however, for to be dependent upon 
the Unoriginate for one's existence is to lack a ground of being in oneself alone, 
which is surely less great than being able to exist on one's own. Such derivative 
being is, as Brian Leftow says, the same way in which created things exist.6 Despite 
its protestations to the contrary, Nicene orthodoxy does not seem to have 
completely exorcised the spirit of subordinationism introduced into Christology by 
the Greek Apologists. Protestants bring all doctrinal statements, even Conciliar 
creeds, before the bar of Scripture. Nothing in Scripture warrants us in thinking 
that Christ is begotten of the Father in his divine nature. 
 
The Economic Trinity and the Ontological Trinity 
 
If, then, we decide to drop from our doctrine of the Trinity the eternal procession 
of the Son and Spirit from the Father, how should we construe the intra-Trinitarian 
relations? Here it will be useful to distinguish between the ontological Trinity and 
the economic Trinity. The ontological Trinity is the Trinity as it exists of itself apart 
from God’s relation to the created order. The economic Trinity has reference to the 
different roles played by the persons of the Trinity in relation to the world and 
especially in the plan of salvation. The question raised by this distinction is the 
degree to which the economic Trinity reflects the ontological Trinity. 
Marcellus of Ancyra, one of the leaders at Nicea, noticed that in John's Gospel 
the Logos is not referred to as “Son” until after the incarnation. Indeed, nowhere in 
the New Testament is Christ unambiguously referred to as "Son" in his pre-
incarnate state (I Jn 4.14 is sometimes suggested, but even it may be read naturally 
in light of the Incarnation). Moreover, he found no biblical grounds for affirming 
the eternal generation of the Logos from the Father. These observations led 
Marcellus to hypothesize that prior to creation, the economic Trinity did not exist. 
The Logos becomes the Son only with his Incarnation. On Marcellus's view 
distinctions present in the economic Trinity need not always reflect distinctions in 
the ontological Trinity.  
Although they did not share Marcellus's maverick view, both Athanasius and 
other members of the Nicene party continued to support him as orthodox. 
Athanasius does consider the view that the Logos became the Son in virtue of his 
union with the flesh (Four Discourses against the Arians 4.20-22). In response to those 
who say that the Logos and the flesh together are the Son, Athanasius replies that 
                                                 
6 Brian Leftow (1999, 232). 
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either the Logos became the Son because of the flesh or else the flesh became the 
Son because of the Logos. In either case, he says, it will be either the Logos or the 
flesh, not their union, which really is the Son. But he notes that his opponents 
might escape his dilemma by holding that the Son is constituted by the 
concurrence of the two, so that neither in isolation can be called the Son. 
Athanasius's objection to this plausible solution is that then the cause of the union 
of the Logos and the flesh is the true Son. But Athanasius's objection does not seem 
to follow. If water is formed by the union of hydrogen and oxygen, it is not the 
cause of their union which is water. Similarly, the Son is the result, not the cause, 
of the union of the Logos with the flesh. Athanasius notes another option that his 
opponents might advocate: that the Son is the Son in name only. This seems even 
more plausible: the Son is not a new substance formed by the union of the Logos 
with the flesh, rather "Son" designates an office or role which the Logos enters into 
in virtue of the Incarnation, just as someone becomes President in virtue of being 
elected to that office. Athanasius objects that then the flesh is the cause of his being 
the Son. But that does not follow; rather it is the union of Logos and flesh together 
that put the Logos into the role of the Son in God's economy.  
On the view I have defended, the persons of the ontological Trinity could be as 
similar to one another as three distinct persons can be, knowing, willing, and 
loving the same things (though each from a different personal perspective, so to 
speak), so that it may well be arbitrary which person plays the role of “Father” and 
which of “Son.” These titles have reference to the economic Trinity, to the roles 
played by the three persons in the plan of salvation with respect to the created 
order. The Son is whichever person becomes incarnate, the Spirit is he who stands 
in the place of and continues the ministry of the Son, and the Father is the one who 
sends the Son and Spirit. In a possible world in which God did not choose to create 
but remained alone, the economic Trinity would not exist, even though the 
ontological Trinity would. Pace Marcellus, however, in the actual world the 
economic Trinity exists eternally, since the persons of the Godhead all know the 
respective roles they will play in God's eternal plan of salvation, even if the 
deployment of that economy does not occur until the fullness of time.  
Moreover, Marcellus went too far in reverting to the view of the Greek 
Apologists that the second and third persons of the ontological Trinity existed only 
in potentiality in God prior to creation, a view which, ironically, reintroduces the 
subordinationism that Marcellus wanted to avoid. On my model there is no danger 
of our lapsing, like Marcellus, into a sort of primordial Unitarianism, since I have 
not grounded the distinctness of the persons of the Trinity in intra-Trinitarian 
relations of any sort. The one spiritual being which is God possesses three distinct 
sets of cognitive faculties each sufficient for self-consciousness, intentionality, and 
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volition, and so for personhood, wholly apart from the intra-Trinitarian relations. 
Indeed, it seems doubtful that mere relations could in any case serve as the basis 
for the ontological distinctness of the persons. For one person can relate to himself, 
for example, as knower/known or lover/beloved. In order for these relations to 
exist between two persons, the persons must exist as distinct individuals logically 
(if not chronologically) prior to their standing in said relations. In other words, the 
persons' distinct existence is explanatorily prior to the relations in which they 
stand, not vice versa. It might be said that in the special case of the father/son 
relation, no one person could stand in such a relation to himself, so that such a 
relation is sufficient to distinguish ontologically persons in the Trinity. But this is 
not in fact true. One of the most popular thought experiments in connection with 
time travel concerns a scenario in which the time traveler goes back in time, 
marries his mother, and begets himself, so that he turns out to be his own father! A 
father/son relation between two persons thus presupposes the logically prior 
individuality of the persons involved. Since entities which stand in a relation seem 
to be explanatorily prior to the relations in which they stand, intra-Trinitarian 
relations already presuppose a plurality of persons in the Godhead, which must be 
grounded in some other way, such as I have proposed.  
 
Conclusion 
 
On the view I prefer, the persons of the ontological Trinity are equal and 
underived. In the economic Trinity, by contrast, there is subordination (or, perhaps 
better, submission) of one person to another, as the incarnate Son does the Father’s 
will and the Spirit speaks, not on His own account, but on behalf of the Son. The 
economic Trinity, while eternal, does not reflect ontological differences between 
the persons but rather is an expression of God’s loving condescension for the sake 
of our salvation. The error of Logos Christology lay in conflating the economic 
Trinity with the ontological Trinity, introducing subordination into the nature of 
the Godhead itself. 
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